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"IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT":
PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS AND SPOUSAL
SUPPORT WAIVERS IN CALIFORNIA
Charlotte K. Goldberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although California was the first state to enact the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), 1 it did not adopt wholeheartedly
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Thanks to Professor Jan Cos-
tello for her comments on an earlier draft. Also thanks to Ashley Silberfeld for
research assistance.
1. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1983); see Act
of Jan. 1, 1985, ch. 1315, 1985 Cal. Stat. 1315 (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE §§
5300-5317, now CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-1617 (West 1998)). To date, 25
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UPAA in various forms.
North Dakota and Virginia also adopted the UPAA in 1985. See N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14.03.1-01 to -09 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -155 (Michie
1999). In 1987, the following states enacted the UPAA: Arkansas, Hawaii,
Maine, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Texas. See ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-401 to -413 (Michie 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572D-1
to -11 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 601-611 (West 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-601 to -610 (1999);'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52B-1 to
-11 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 108.700-.740 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-
17-1 to -11 (1999); TEX. FAM. CODEANN. §§ 4.001-.010 (West 1999). Kansas
and New Jersey enacted the UPAA in 1988. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-801
to -811 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-31 to -41 (West 1999). Illinois, Ne-
vada and South Dakota enacted the UPAA in 1989. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 10/1-11 (West 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123A.010-.100 (2000); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-2-16 to -25 (Michie 2000). Arizona and Iowa followed
in 1991. See ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-201 to -205 (1999); IOWA CODE §§
596.1 -.12 (1997). Nebraska and Utah then enacted the UPAA in 1994. See
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1001 to -1011 (Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 30-8-1 to -9 (1999). Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Idaho and New
Mexico enacted the UPAA in 1995. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-36a to -36j
(1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-141 to -150 (1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-921 to
-929 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1 to -10 (Michie 2000). Lastly,
Delaware and Indiana enacted it in 1996 and 1997, respectively. See DEL.
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the "freedom of contract"2 philosophy evinced by that Act. The leg-
islature omitted the UPAA section dealing with spousal support
when it adopted the California Premarital Agreement Act (CPAA).
3
By this omission, the legislature, in effect, prohibited prospective
spouses from contracting "with respect to . . . the modification or
elimination of spousal support.' 4 In a recent decision of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, Pendleton v. Fireman,5 Justice Miriam A. Vo-
gel held that the omission of that section signified something very
different.6 "It is clear, therefore, that the legislature deleted the ex-
press authorization for spousal support waivers because they recog-
nized that the enforceability of such waivers is a question for the
courts, not the legislature."
7
Under this reasoning, Justice Vogel was able to pose the ques-
tion of whether "spousal support waivers in premarital agreements
violate any public policy .... 8 Here she was referring to the catch-
all phrase in both the UPAA and the CPAA which allows prospec-
tive spouses to contract respecting "any other matter, including their
personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a
statute imposing a criminal penalty."9  Concluding that both the
CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 321-328 (1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-11-3-1 to -10
(Michie 1999).
2. "'Subsection (b) undergirds the freedom allowed the parties by making
clear that the terms of the agreement respecting maintenance and property dis-
position are binding upon the court unless those terms are found to be uncon-
scionable."' UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 377
(quoting Commissioner's Note to § 306 of Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act).
3. See Act of Jan. 1, 1985, ch. 1315, 1985 Cal. Stat. 1315 (codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5300-5317, now CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-1617 (West
1998)).
4. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. at 373. The
Legislature also omitted UPAA § 6(b), which states that "[i]f a provision of a
premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support.... ." Obviously,
if the California Act does not allow contracting regarding spousal support, the
need for § 6(b) is obviated.
5. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 957 P.2d 867, 76
Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (1998).
6. See id. at 843.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8), 9B U.L.A. at 373; CAL.
FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(7) (West 1998).
1246
"IF ITAIN'TBROKE, DON'TFIXIT"
times and the law have changed,10 she stated that "a system of laws
... should not per se prohibit premarital spousal support waivers or
limitations"1' and that "[flor those who choose to control their own
destiny to the extent permitted by law, there no longer exists any rea-
son to per se prohibit spousal support waivers or limitations. 12
The Pendleton case has been accepted for review by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. One threshold argument concerns who should
decide-the courts or the legislature-whether spousal support may
be waived via premarital agreement. The view of this author is that
setting policy on this issue should be a legislative decision. 13 No
matter who decides, the Pendleton case spotlights the need to re-
examine California policy regarding spousal support waivers1 4 in
premarital agreements.
First, if prospective spouses may arrange all their property rights
during marriage and at divorce via premarital agreement, is there any
good reason to prohibit their agreeing prior to marriage to waive
spousal support in the event of divorce? Are there fundamental dif-
ferences between property rights and spousal support that account for
differences in treatment in the formation of premarital agreements?
This author views the prohibition of spousal support waivers to be
10. Justice Vogel was referring to the increased use of premarital agree-
ments by marital couples and the elimination of fault divorce and the equality
in both division and management of community property. See Pendleton, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-45; see, e.g., David E. Rovella, Pre-nups No Longer Just
for the Wealthy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at Al.
11. Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845.
12. Id. at 848.
13. In another context, this author has counseled court deference to the leg-
islature stating that "[i]f a court determines that an inequity exists under the
current law, the correct action is to still follow that law but point out that the
inequity should be remedied by the legislature." Charlotte K. Goldberg, Estate
of Castiglioni: Spousal Murder and the Clash of Joint Tenancy and Equity in
California Community Property Law, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 513, 532 (1997).
Candace Pendleton argues that dramatic policy change should be left to the
legislature where "the potential for a diversity of interests and positions among
members of the public" can be weighed. Respondent-Petitioner's Opening
Brief on the Merits at 39, Pendleton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App.
1998) (No. B113293).
14. This Article addresses primarily waivers of spousal support after dis-
solution. The issue of waiving spousal support during marriage and between
separation and dissolution is beyond the scope of this Article. A brief discus-
sion of these issues is found infra note 64.
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salutary despite changes in attitudes toward premarital agreements
and in the law of premarital agreements. Although it is thought that
premarital agreements encourage couples to marry and clarify prop-
erty rights upon divorce, the appropriateness of spousal support
should still be decided on a case-by-case basis by the courts. In other
words, if we have a clear rule that is not "broken," let us keep it.
Second, if the California Supreme Court or the California legis-
lature should decide to change the law to allow spousal support
waivers in premarital agreements, even Justice Vogel admits, the
parties may need protection against unconscionable provisions in a
premarital agreement. 15 Generally, a premarital agreement may be
challenged as unconscionable either at the time of execution or at
dissolution. However, under the UPAA, a premarital agreement will
not be enforced if the agreement was unconscionable when executed
and disclosure of the property or financial obligations was inade-
quate.16 The UPAA "unconscionable" requirement strongly supports
certainty in enforcement-the burden of proof is on the "party
against whom enforcement is sought," the agreement must be un-
conscionable "at the time of execution" not at dissolution, uncon-
scionable is left to the courts to define, and the agreement must also
be lacking in fair disclosure. 17 California adopted this UPAA section
and Justice Vogel noted regarding the unconscionable requirement
that "our decision in this case suggests a need for legislative
15. See Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845 n.9.
16. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 376
(1987). Alternatively, under § 6(a)(1), a premarital agreement will not be en-
forced if it was not executed voluntarily. See id. § 6(a)(1). Some states have
modified the UPAA to permit unconscionability at dissolution. See infra note
106.
17. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a), 9B U.L.A. at 376. "[T]he
drafters of the U.P.A.A. seem to have so constrained the available challenges
to antenuptial agreements that such agreements would survive in circumstances
that the ordinary commercial contract would not." Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten
Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 146 (1993). "[A]n agreement is unenforceable only if it
is both procedurally unfair and substantively unfair (i.e., unconscionable). Un-
conscionability, standing alone, should be the basis for setting aside or at least
modifying a premarital agreement, as is the case with ordinary contracts."
Carol Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L.
& FEMINIsM 229, 276 (1994) (citations omitted).
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reexamination of the enforcement issues .... ,18 Thus, spouses do
need some protection regarding spousal support waivers.
Not all spousal support waivers are enforceable, even under the
UPAA. Section 6(b) of the UPAA permits a court to order spousal
support if the waiver or modification "causes one party to the agree-
ment to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance
at the time of separation or marital dissolution."'1 9 The California
legislature omitted this section when it omitted spousal support
waivers from the CPAA. If California changes the law to allow
spousal support waivers, this section must also be added to at least
"provide very limited relief to a party who would otherwise be eligi-
ble for public welfare." 20 In addition, relief from spousal support
waivers must be considered in tandem with the present standards re-
garding spousal support awards. 21 For instance, spousal support
awards in California are set based on the marital standard of living,
not on an amount that would keep the supported spouse off of public
assistance.22 Also, the major thrust of recent California spousal sup-
port legislation is to enable a former spouse to become self-
supporting and not rely on support from either the state or an ex-
spouse.23
If California decides to permit spousal support waivers, courts
should be given the opportunity to examine whether the waiver
should be enforced at dissolution. Two formulations which allow
courts discretion at dissolution deserve consideration. First, the
Illinois and Indiana Premarital Agreement Acts specify that if waiver
or modification causes one party to the agreement "undue
18. Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845 n.9.
19. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. at 376. Cali-
fornia did not adopt this UPAA section. If spousal support waivers are pro-
hibited, there is no need for this section.
20. Id. § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 377.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 64-76.
22. "[T]he court shall consider all of the following circumstances: (a) The
extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the
standard of living established during the marriage. . . ." CAL. FAM. CODE §
4320(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added). "In a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall make specific
factual findings with respect to the standard of living during the marriage
." Id. § 4332 (emphasis added).
23. See id. §§ 4320(k), 4330(b).
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hardship" 24 or "extreme hardship"25 considering circumstances "not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the execution of the agree-
ment," a court is permitted to order support to avoid the hardship.
These provisions allow a court to examine the agreement at the time
of dissolution and to determine exactly what is undue or extreme
hardship under the circumstances. Under these criteria, a former
spouse need not be at the level of requiring public assistance to ob-
tain spousal support.
Second, the New Jersey Premarital Agreement Act defines an
"unconscionable premarital agreement '26 as an agreement, either due
to lack of property or unemployability:
(1) Which would render a spouse without reasonable sup-
port;
(2) Which would make a spouse a public charge; or
(3) Which would provide a standard of living far below
that which was enjoyed before the marriage.
This provision gives the courts discretion to order spousal support
despite a waiver in the premarital agreement. Thus the New Jersey
Premarital Agreement Act allows parties to contract regarding the
waiver of spousal support, but also allows the courts a supervisory
role at the time of enforcement. If California allows spousal support
waivers, it should adopt either of the above formulations. Either
provision would assure that spousal support waivers will be enforced
in all but the most egregious cases. However, this author returns to
her initial contention that a clear rule prohibiting spousal support
waivers leaves the courts with only one issue-whether spousal sup-
port is appropriate under the circumstances. On that issue, the Cali-
fornia legislature has delineated clear guidelines on whether spousal
support is necessary in a particular case.
Part II describes the Pendleton v. Fireman court of appeal deci-
sion and explores the bases for prohibiting spousal support waivers.
Part III examines other options for dealing with the unforeseen
economic inequities that can result when a spouse waives spousal
support. Part IV discusses whether "substantive unconscionability"
24. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(b) (West 1999).
25. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8(b)(2) (Michie 1999).
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-32(c) (West 1999).
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is a workable standard to prevent economic inequities that result
from a waiver of property and spousal support in a premarital agree-
ment. The author recommends that the present prohibition on
spousal support waivers be retained. If spousal support waivers are
permitted, however, the courts should be allowed to examine
whether the waiver should be enforced if it would impose extreme
hardship or render a spouse without reasonable support upon divorce.
II. PENDLETON V. FIREMAN AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAIVERS
Pendleton v. Fireman arose from the dissolution of the marriage
of two wealthy individuals, Candace Pendleton and Barry Fireman.
Barry's wealth far exceeded Candace's-at the time of dissolution
Candace's monthly gross income was estimated at almost $9000,
while Barry's was almost $83,000.27 During the four-year marriage,
they lived a lavish lifestyle that was funded primarily from Barry's
resources.28 Although conventional wisdom dictated that spousal
support waivers in premarital agreements were prohibited,29 the cou-
ple signed an agreement that stated "both parties now and forever
waive, in the event of a dissolution of the marriage, all rights to any
type of spousal support ... from the other . ,30 Candace chal-
lenged the spousal support waiver, claiming that it was unenforce-
able because it was against public policy, and sought substantial
spousal support.31  The trial court agreed, concluding that all
27. See Appellant-Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 3,
Pendleton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. B 113293).
28. See Respondent-Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 9,
Pendleton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 840 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. B 113293).
29. See WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA
PRACTICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW ch. 6-B (1998); 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW § 16, at 26 (9th ed. 1990).
30. Appellant-Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 2, Pendleton v.
Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 840 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. B113293). The agree-
ment was drafted by Candace's attorney and both parties were represented by
separate counsel. See id. The California Premarital Agreement Act (CPAA) is
explicit that "[t]he right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by
a premarital agreement." CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(b) (West 1998).
31. See Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840 (1998).
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premarital spousal support waivers are void and unenforceable. 32
Barry was ordered to pay spousal support.
3 3
On appeal, Justice Vogel noted that "41 states and the District of
Columbia now permit premarital waivers of spousal support. . .. "34
She then discussed California's omission of spousal support from the
permitted subjects of a premarital agreement, concluding that the
"reason for this omission is clear."35 According to the legislative
history, the omission was to "allow California case law to continue to
prevail on the issue of spousal support in premarital agreements."
36
To Justice Vogel, this signaled that "enforceability of such waivers is
a question for the courts, not the Legislature." 37 Although this inter-
pretation of the legislative history allowed Justice Vogel to revisit the
subject of premarital spousal support waivers, it was a novel and ar-
guably incorrect interpretation.
It is true that the California legislature could have added lan-
guage that explicitly stated that spousal support waivers were pro-
hibited. Both the Iowa and New Mexico versions of the UPAA state
that a premarital agreement may not "adversely affect" spousal sup-
port rights. 38 In effect, those legislatures have specifically precluded
prospective spouses from predetermining spousal support upon di-
vorce. Although the CPAA is not as clear as the Iowa and New
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 841 n.3.
35. Id. at 842.
36. Id. at 843 (quoting ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, REPORT ON SEN. BILL NO. 1143 FOR THE AUG. 19, 1985 HEARING 3).
37. Id.
38. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.5(2) (West 1997) (stating that "[t]he right
of a spouse or child to support shall not be adversely affected by a premarital
agreement"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-4(B) (Michie 2000) (stating that "[a]
premarital agreement may not adversely affect the right of a child or spouse to
support"). In South Dakota, the legislature also omitted spousal support as a
subject of a premarital agreement. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-18 (Mi-
chie 2000). Waivers of spousal support violate public policy. See Connolly v.
Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44, 46 (S.D. 1978) (quoting Reiling v. Reiling, 474
P.2d 327, 328 (Or. 1970) (post-divorce obligation of support cannot be waived
because "conditions which affect alimony entitlement cannot accurately be
foreseen")); Greene v. Morgan, Theeler, Cogley, & Peterson, 575 N.W.2d 457,




Mexico versions of the UPAA, the California legislature, by deleting
spousal support as a proper subject of premarital agreements, in-
tended to preclude predetermination of spousal support upon di-
vorce.39 The CPAA in essence "allow[ed] California case law to
continue to prevail on the issue of spousal support in premarital
agreements., 40 The legislative history also shows that the Bar op-
posed a change in the law prohibiting spousal support waivers. For
instance, the Family Law Section of the State Bar of California op-
posed the bill if it would "legitimize a waiver of spousal support.
' 41
Allowing such waivers "would be a major change in California law,
which still steadfastly holds that such provisions are contrary to the
public policy of this state." 42 Similarly, the Women Lawyers' Asso-
ciation of Los Angeles opposed any change in "existing California
law, which does not enforce premarital waivers of spousal support
... .". 43 That California case law, as gleaned from the two Supreme
Court decisions, Marriage of Higgason44 and Marriage of Dawley,
45
held that a spousal support waiver in a premarital agreement is
against public policy and therefore void. A premarital spousal sup-
port waiver is considered against public policy because it would en-
courage or promote dissolution.
46
As Justice Vogel pointed out, this "public policy" originated in
the days before no-fault divorce and when unequal control of com-
munity property prevailed.47 The first case that articulated the policy
was Pereira v. Pereira,48 decided in 1909. The motivating idea was
39. See supra note 29.
40. Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843 (citing ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, REPORT ON SEN. BILL No. 1143
FOR THE AUG. 19, 1985 HEARING 3).
41. Letter from Margaret L. Anderson to Assemblyman Lloyd G. Connelly
(Aug. 14, 1985) (on file with the Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
42. Id.
43. Letter from Mary-Lynne Fisher, Women Lawyers' Association of Los
Angeles, to Senator Robert Beverly (June 6, 1985) (on file with the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review).
44. 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973).
45. 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
46. See id. at 352, 551 P.2d at 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
47. See Pendleton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 1998),
review granted, 957 P.2d. 867, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (1998).
48. 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
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that a spouse cannot escape punishment for marital fault by a pre-
marital waiver of an obligation at divorce. 49 With the advent of no-
fault divorce came equal division of community property;50 spouses
were given equal management and control of community property
during marriage.51 Thus Justice Vogel concluded that: "A system of
laws that has abandoned fault-based divorce and unequal control of
community property in favor of a statutory scheme imposing mutual
and androgynous support obligations ... should not per se prohibit
premarital spousal support waivers or limitations." 52 Justice Vogel
neglects the reality that legal equality for women has not yet pro-
duced economic equality with men, particularly upon divorce.
53
The question then becomes whether, in light of legal equality of
spouses, there is reason to prohibit spousal support waivers today.
This question can be rephrased: Should a spouse, through a pre-
marital agreement, be able to escape all monetary obligations that
flow from marriage? This is particularly pertinent since there is uni-
versal agreement that spouses may opt out of the community prop-
erty scheme through a premarital agreement. 54  Thus, one could
49. See id. at 4, 103 P. at 489.
The real effect of the contract to pay the ten thousand dollars, so far as
the husband is concerned, would be to provide against liability for a
contemplated wrong to be subsequently inflicted by him upon his
wife, and to liquidate such liability in advance of the commission of
the wrong.
Id.
50. "[T]he court shall ...divide the community estate of the parties
equally." CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West Supp. 2000).
51. "[E]ither spouse has the management and control of the community
personal property.... ." Id. § 1100(a).
52. Pendleton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 843 (Ct. App. 1998), re-
view granted, 957 P.2d. 867, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (1998).
53. See Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of
Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 147, 148-51
(1996) (describing the economic inequality of men and women). "It is widely
known that women are second-class citizens compared to men in the economic
arena." Id. at 148.
54. "Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to all of
the following: (1) The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of
the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or lo-
cated." CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(1) (West 1998).
1254
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argue that if opting out of community property obligations is not
against public policy, then neither is opting out of spousal support.
The "encouraging divorce" public policy basis for prohibiting
spousal support waivers is subject to doubt, as pointed out in the
Oregon Supreme Court case of Unander v. Unander.55 According to
the court, "the provision for no alimony may work to preserve a mar-
riage as much as to destroy it.",56 The premise of the "encouraging
divorce" public policy is that a spousal support waiver would en-
courage an economically superior spouse to divorce because that
spouse would have no obligation to support the economically inferior
spouse. The premise is faulty, according to the Unander court, be-
cause a premarital waiver of spousal support may also encourage an
economically inferior spouse to remain in the marriage, knowing that
a spousal support award would not be forthcoming at dissolution.57
The approval of premarital agreements regarding arrangement of
property rights at divorce also demonstrates the flaw in the "encour-
aging divorce" public policy basis. The Unander court noted that
"such agreements can be a cause of divorce as much as an agreement
on alimony... though such agreements have been favored in law."
58
A property provision benefiting the economically superior spouse
allows that spouse to divorce without suffering economic disadvan-
tage and could encourage divorce. The reciprocal effect would be to
encourage the economically inferior spouse to stay in the marriage
since the premarital agreement would exacerbate the economic det-
riment of divorce. This leads to the following conclusion-because
property and spousal support provisions would have the same recip-
rocal effects regarding divorce, it is logical to treat them the same
55. 506 P.2d 719, 720 (Or. 1973).
56. Id. at 721.
57. See id.
58. Id.
An argument can be made that any antenuptial agreement concerning
the disposition of property upon.., divorce may result in one of them
ultimately being put in a position where he or she is not adequately
provided for, and, therefore, insofar as public policy is concerned, an-
tenuptial agreements concerning alimony and property should be
treated similarly.
Reiling v. Reiling, 474 P.2d 327, 329 (Or. 1970) (holding the alimony waiver
void as against public policy).
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way. They should both be permitted subjects of premarital agree-
ments.
59
However, premarital spousal support waivers may be distin-
guished from property provisions in two ways. "[T]he state has an
interest in the support of its citizens and one spouse's duty to support
the other cannot be nullified by private agreement." 60 First, the state
prefers that an ex-spouse be supported by the other ex-spouse rather
than from state coffers. This is primarily to protect the state fisc
when a person may have to resort to welfare assistance for support.
On this point, the UPAA agrees. Although the UPAA included
spousal support waivers as a proper subject of premarital agreements,
it also recognized that spousal support should not be eliminated or
modified to the point that it would cause "one party to the agreement
to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the
time of separation or marital dissolution." 61 The duty to support after
divorce also derives from the premise that the economic benefits be-
stowed on married couples by the state carry with them concomitant
economic obligations. These exist beyond the end of the marital
union where one ex-spouse cannot be self-supporting.
Second, fairness demands different treatment of spousal support
from property rights because of the unpredictability of the spouses'
economic circumstances at the time of dissolution. The discretion of
the courts to award spousal support mitigates the economic dispari-
ties that can result when one spouse suffers unexpected illness or de-
votes significant time to child rearing.62 California opted to deal
59. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Econ-
omy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 135 (1998) (suggesting that because monetary and
non-monetary contributions to marriage are not treated equally, premarital
agreements governing monetary issues of property division and spousal sup-
port should not be enforced or should at least be reviewed with extreme skepti-
cism).
60. Unander, 506 P.2d at 721; see also Silbaugh, supra note 59, at 83-86
(discussing this policy rationale).
61. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
62. "It is not unrealistic to recognize that the health and employability of
the spouse may have so deteriorated during a marriage that to enforce the
maintenance provisions of an antenuptial agreement would result in the spouse
becoming a public charge." Newman v. Newman (In re Marriage of New-
man), 653 P.2d 728, 735 (Colo. 1982).
[A] spouse should be given the opportunity to prove, through clear and
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with these unforeseen circumstances by omitting waivers of spousal
support as a subject of premarital agreements.
63
The duty to support a spouse during marriage has never been in
doubt. 64 However, if the marriage contract is treated as an ordinary
convincing evidence, that the amount of time and energy necessary for
that spouse to shelter and care for the children of the marriage has
rendered the terms of a prenuptial agreement inequitable, and unjust
and thus, avoidable.
Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 1990) (McDermott, J., dissent-
ing).
63. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (West 1998). "[T]he rule prohibiting an-
tenuptial agreements concerning alimony gives courts the ability to allow the
wife and society a measure of protection and still leaves the parties to the mar-
riage as much freedom as possible to contract concerning their affairs." Reil-
ing v. Reiling, 474 P.2d 327, 329 (Or. 1970).
64. "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual
respect, fidelity, and support." CAL. FAM. CODE § 720 (emphasis added).
"[A] married person is personally liable for... necessaries of life of the per-
son's spouse while the spouses are living together." Id. § 914(a)(1).
The UPAA § 3(a)(4) allows spouses to contract "with respect to... the
modification or elimination of spousal support." UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. at 369. The plain language indicates
that the waiver is not limited to spousal support after dissolution of the mar-
riage and could include spousal support at least between the time of separation
and dissolution or resolution of all issues. Those states that have considered
the issue are split. Recent cases have allowed premarital waivers of alimony
pendente lite. See Darr v. Darr, 950 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that antenuptial agreement denying pendente lite alimony was not un-
conscionable where a wife was provided with a share of the marital property);
Clanton v. Clanton, 592 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding
that antenuptial agreement renouncing all claims to support, including mainte-
nance pendente lite is enforceable where wife is capable of self-support);
Musko v. Musko, 697 A.2d 255, 256 (Pa. 1997) (finding that prenuptial
agreement precluding a claim to "money or property or alimony or support"
included alimony pendente lite is subject to enforcement). Older cases refuse
to uphold premarital agreements that waive alimonypendente lite. See Belcher
v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. 1972) (holding that the right of support
prior to dissolution of the marriage cannot be waived by antenuptial agree-
ment); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 710 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(stating that because perceptions have changed, the issue is one of great public
importance that may require review); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.2d 680, 683-
84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that antenuptial agreement waiving all rights to
maintenance is unfair due to wife's financial circumstances); Eule v. Eule, 320
N.E.2d 506, 510 (Il. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that an antenuptial agreement
may not waive temporary alimony unless the agreement guarantees an equita-
ble financial settlement); McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85, 90-91 (La.
1996) (upholding antenuptial agreement that waived permanent alimony but
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contract, once the contract has ended the parties should have no fur-
ther obligations to each other.65 Especially when the rationales of
fault and gender inequality were undermined, the duty of support af-
ter divorce "had no theory to explain it."66 Despite the lack of legal
theory, spousal support is still awarded, especially in long-term mar-
riages where one spouse was a homemaker, or in shorter duration
marriages where there were young children in the care of one
spouse.67 The ostensible basis is "need," but the difficulty of defin-
ing that term has led to confusion.6 8 More recently, there has been a
shift to short-term spousal support awards to provide a transition for
a financially dependent spouse.69  The purpose of these limited-
duration awards is to enable the spouse to become self-supporting
distinguished alimony pendente lite); Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618,
620 (La. 1978) (finding that an antenuptial agreement that waives right to ali-
mony pendente lite is null and void as against public policy); Mulvey v. Mul-
vey, No. 95-11-2507, 1996 WL 724759, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (stating
that temporary support may be awarded despite antenuptial agreement to the
contrary); Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits
of Private Ordering, 73 IND. L.J. 503, 508-09 (1998); Laura P. Graham, Com-
ment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The
Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1037, 1038-44 (1993).
65. In California, once separation has occurred, the property earned by each
spouse is separate property. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 1998); In re
Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 448, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1977)
("The question is whether the parties' conduct evidences a complete and final
break in the marital relationship."). However, a spouse is obligated for com-
mon necessaries up until the time of dissolution. See id. §§ 914(a)(2), 2623(a).
As far as support is concerned, pendente lite spousal support is routinely
granted until the actual support award is determined. See id. § 3600.
66. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (Proposed Final Draft,
Part I, 1997).
67. See id. at5.
68. See id. at 5-6.
69. See id. at 4-5.
Thirty years ago when most domestic practitioners in the United States
thought of spousal support, they envisioned an award of permanent
monthly payments until the death or the remarriage of the recipient...
[t]oday, when domestic practitioners in most states think of spousal
support, they envision an award of monthly payments for a specific
term of years.
Brett R. Turner, Rehabilitative Alimony Reconsidered: The "Second Wave" of
Spousal Support Reform, 10 DIvORCE LITIG. 185, 185 (1998).
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within a reasonable period of time.70 Under California Family Code
section 4320(k), "a reasonable period of time" is considered "one-
half the length of the marriage."
71
In California, the shift to limited-duration awards preceded en-
actment of section 4320(k) in 1996. Especially in short-term mar-
riages, spousal support is appropriate "for assisting an economically
disadvantaged spouse to make an orderly and less traumatic transi-
tion to self-supporting status.,,72 Even in long-term marriages, the
goal is for the ex-spouse to become self-supporting. In the recent
case Marriage of Schaffer,73 the California Court of Appeal affirmed
termination of spousal support, reasoning that fifteen years was suf-
ficient opportunity for the wife to become self-supporting.74 The
marriage had been a long one, twenty-four years, and the wife, who
was sixty-three years old, suffered from numerous health problems
and was unable to find employment. 75 Yet the trial court's decision
that "enough was enough" was affirmed, albeit with a vigorous dis-
sent.
76
70. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(k) (West 1998).
71. Id.
72. In re Marriage of Prietsch, 190 Cal. App. 3d 645, 656 n.3, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 587, 590 n.3 (1987); see In re Marriage of Hebbring, 207 Cal. App. 3d
1260, 1266-67, 255 Cal. Rptr. 488, 491 (1989) (retaining jurisdiction where
marriage is short, spouse is in good health and has permanent employment is
reversible error, although six months of spousal support is appropriate).
73. Schaffer v. Schaffer (In re Marriage of Schaffer), 69 Cal. App. 4th 801,
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (1999); see also In re Marriage of Rising, 76 Cal. App.
4th 472, 478-79 n.9, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385 n.9 (1999) ("Indeed, the Family
Code now presumes the supported spouse should be self-supporting within a
period equal to one-half the length of the marriage.").
74. See Schaffer, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 812, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804.
75. See id. at 803, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
76. See id. at 812-17, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804-07 (Sonenshine, J., dissent-
ing). In 1999, the California Legislature amended section 4320(k) of the Cali-
fornia Family Code concerning long marriages. The section now states that
"[e]xcept in case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a
'reasonable period of time' for purposes of this section generally shall be one-
half the length of the marriage." CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(k) (West Supp.
1999). Under section 4336 of the California Family Code, "there is a pre-
sumption... that a marriage of ten years or more, from the date of marriage to
the date of separation, is a marriage of long duration." CAL. FAM. CODE §
4336 (West 1998).
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The shift from open-ended spousal support to limited-duration
spousal support also affects premarital agreements. If the present
rule barring spousal support waivers is retained, a wealthy spouse
could be assured that under current law, any spousal support obliga-
tion would be short-term. Marriage of Huntington77 illustrates the
results under present spousal support guidelines. John Huntington,
who is heir to the Huntington railroad fortune,78 was married to his
wife Ann for almost four years.79 They had a premarital agreement
providing that their property was to remain separate.80 John's net
worth was in excess of $15 million.8 1 Ann was twenty-eight at the
time of their marriage and had been working as a dental hygienist
earning about $30,000 a year before their marriage.82 The trial court
ordered spousal support of $5,000 per month for only six months.
83
Ann appealed.84 The court of appeal affirmed both the amount and
duration of the award.85 Of particular importance were the trial
court's conclusions:
In any event, when analyzing the length of the marriage, the
life style, the assets of the parties, the marketable skills of
[appellant], the availability of her employment, the time in
which it would take to get back into the work force and the
reasonably full-time employed-that's something she
doesn't want to do, but clearly has the ability to do it-
constrains me to make the following orders with regards to
spousal support.
86
The court of appeal also noted that Ann had already received
77. Huntington v. Huntington (In re Marriage of Huntington), 10 Cal. App.
4th 1513, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1992).
78. The San Francisco railroad magnates, Colis P. Huntington, Leland Stan-
ford, Charles Crocker, and Mark Hopkins, amassed fortunes in the late 1800s.
Huntington died in 1900 with an estate estimated between $50 and $80 million.
See GUsTAvUs MYERS, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 526-28
(1907).






85. See id. at 1525, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8-9.
86. Id. at 1520-21, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
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eighteen months of temporary support at $7,500 per month.87 Thus
the total would be $165,000 over a period of two years. 88 The court
of appeal denied that the spousal support award was an abuse of dis-
cretion.
89
If the Huntingtons' premarital agreement had included a spousal
support waiver, which John would probably have insisted on and
Justice Vogel thinks should be permitted, there would arguably have
been no litigation and no spousal support award at all. However, un-
der California's policy of assisting a spouse to become self-
supporting, a spouse would still receive temporary support until ac-
tual dissolution of the marriage. 90 Yet, Ann may have been tempted
to challenge the enforcement of the agreement against her under the
CPAA enforcement provisions. According to the present provisions
of the CPAA, Family Code section 1615, she would bear the burden
of proving that the agreement was not entered into voluntarily or that
it was unconscionable at the time of execution and that disclosure
was inadequate.
91
The question of "voluntariness" was recently examined in the
divorce of Barry Bonds from his wife Susann (Sun).92 Although the
court of appeal focused on the premarital agreement's "procedural"
aspects of adequate disclosure and availability of independent legal
counsel rather than "substantive" fairness, 93 it noted that when Sun
met Barry in 1987, his salary was $106,000, and at the time of the
dissolution proceeding in 1996, his salary was $8 million per year.
94
The agreement provided that the earnings "from husband and wife
during marriage shall be separate property of that spouse" but was
87. See id. at 1516, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 2.
88. The court rejected Ann's request for attorney's fees and costs totaling
$61,912.43. Earlier John had been ordered to pay $19,000 of Ann's attorney's
fees. According to the trial court, "[a]ttomeys' fees in this case, to establish a
support order for a healthy lady, after three-and-a-half-year marriage, are out-
rageous, in my judgment, for both sides... [it] is only as a consequence of the
fact that Mr. Huntington has money .... " Id. at 1524, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
89. See id. at 1522, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6.
90. See supra note 65.
91. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 1998).
92. See Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783
(Ct. App. 1999), review granted, 981 P.2d 40, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410 (1999).
93. See id. at 796.
94. See id. at 787.
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silent on the issue of spousal support.95 The trial court awarded Sun
$10,000 per month as spousal support for a period of four and one-
half years. 96 Because the premarital agreement was declared invalid
under the circumstances, 97 "Sun's economic status may be substan-
tially changed." 98 This means that on remand, Sun may be entitled to
one-half of all of Barry's earnings which, absent the agreement,
would be considered community property.
If instead, the property provisions of the agreement had been de-
clared valid, only the amount and duration of the spousal support
award would have been considered. In this case, Sun is young but
was also awarded primary physical custody of the couple's two chil-
dren. 99 Before she married Barry, she had been attending beautician
school. 100 After they married, she did not work outside the home. 1° I
The duration of the spousal support award by the trial court was
more than one-half the duration of the marriage, which is considered
reasonable under the statutory guideline. Also, the trial court has
discretion to vary the duration which may be appropriate when the
children are not yet in school full-time. Yet, it is doubtful that a
spousal support award totaling $540,000102 would be considered an
abuse of discretion. Thus the economic disparity resulting from the
property arrangement would be mitigated.
It must be noted that in long-term marriages and shorter-term
marriages where there are young children, wives are still disadvan-
taged. Justice Lambden observed in Bonds that "women still have
not achieved economic parity in the workplace and frequently have
greater responsibility for sustaining the home; it is also undisputed
that women generally earn less income than men."'1 3 The suggestion
95. Id. at 789.
96. See id. at 812.
97. See id. at 787. The court held that where an unrepresented party did not
have the opportunity to obtain legal counsel, the premarital agreement is sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny." The court of appeals reversed the lower court's find-
ing that the premarital agreement was valid and remanded on that issue. Id.
98. Id. at 815.
99. Seeid. at 813.
100. See id. at 787.
101. See id. at 789.
102. That would be $10,000 a month for 4.5 years.
103. Id. at 795; see Nicole M. Catanzarite, Note, A Commendable Goal:
Public Policy and the Fate of Spousal Support After 1996, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
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is that agreements that waive community property rights may disad-
vantage those whose contributions are in the home, whether men or
women, and thus should be given greater scrutiny at the time of en-
forcement.'0 4 It is more likely that wives are the ones challenging
the validity of premarital agreements. In an admittedly unscientific
survey of appellate cases from 1997, of the twenty-four divorce cases
involving challenges to premarital agreements, twenty were by
wives, only four by husbands. 10 5 Although Justice Vogel is correct
REv. 1387, 1392-93 (1998).
104. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795; Silbaugh, supra note 59, at 92-101
(arguing that non-monetary contributions, particularly of women, are under-
valued in legal doctrine).
105. The 1997 divorce cases were ones in which the wife challenged the va-
lidity of the agreement. In several Connecticut cases, the validity of premarital
agreements was challenged by the wife. See Lord v. Lord, 689 A.2d 509, 510
(Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that prenuptial agreement was unenforceable
due to informality of agreement); Ehlert v. Ehlert, No. 354292, 1997 WL
53346, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1997) (holding that the prenuptial
agreement was void due to later oral agreement); Brooks v. Brooks, No. FA
9501430865, 1997 WL 297586, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 20, 1997) (find-
ing that it was unfair to enforce terms of prenuptial agreement); Dattilo v. For-
gione, No. FA9703415745, 1997 WL 374978, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 26,
1997) (holding the prenuptial agreement valid under New York and Connecti-
cut law); Juliano v. Juliano, No. FA94039973, 1997 WL 576544, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 1997) (finding prenuptial agreement unenforceable due to
coercion); Mehtar v. Mehtar, No. FA9600800075, 1997 WL 576540, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 1997) (upholding a South African antenuptial
agreement). The validity of premarital agreements was also challenged in
Delaware. See Coulboum v. Coulboum, 692 A.2d 411 (Del. 1997) (unpub-
lished disposition) (setting aside premarital agreement). In several cases in
Florida, Iowa, and Minnesota, the validity of premarital agreements was also
challenged. See Eager v. Eager, 696 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (upholding antenuptial agreement); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561
N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (stating the prenuptial agreement was in-
valid because wife did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her rights); Ede-
vold v. Edevold, No. C6-97-92, 1997 WL 309484, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June
10, 1997) (finding the antenuptial agreement invalid due to lack of disclosure).
The validity of premarital agreements was also questioned in Missouri. See
Darr v. Darr, 950 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. 1997) (stating the antenuptial agree-
ment was valid and the disclosure sufficient); McGilley v. McGilley, 951
S.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding the antenuptial agreement
sufficiently clear to be enforced); Dardick v. Dardick, 948 S.W.2d 268, 269
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the antenuptial agreement valid under California
law). New York decisions also discussed the validity of premarital agree-
ments. See Lombardi v. Lombardi, 652 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1997) (holding the pre-
nuptial agreement enforceable finding no fraud, overreaching, or other mis-
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that the law has changed regarding fault, the economic equality of
women has yet to be achieved. This is especially true for those who
marry with the expectation of a long, happy marriage as a home-
maker and with children. To leave them without any recourse be-
cause of a premarital spousal support waiver is manifestly unfair.
III. OPTIONS AVAILABLE WHEN DEALING WITH
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY RESULTING FROM
SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAIVERS
To account for unforeseen circumstances at divorce, some states
have departed from the original version of the UPAA by determining
"unconscionability" of the premarital agreement not at the time of
execution, but at the time of enforcement. 10 6  Traditionally,
conduct); Djavaheri-Saatchi v. Djavaheri-Saatchi, 654 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1997)
(stating the challenge to the prenuptial agreement was time-barred); Rupert v.
Rupert, 667 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538-39 (1997) (finding the antenuptial agreement
valid as modified). Ohio also has a decision challenging the validity of a pre-
marital agreement. See Parr v. Parr, No. 70300, 1997 WL 97231, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1997) (holding the antenuptial agreement void due to lack of
full disclosure). Finally, Tennessee and Wisconsin decisions have also dis-
cussed the validity of premarital agreements. See Williams v. Kuykendall, No.
03A01-9705-CV-00167, 1997 WL 671925, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29,
1997) (finding the antenuptial agreement void due to duress and insufficient
disclosure); Boone v. Boone, No. 02A01-9507-cH-00144, 1997 WL 142346, at
*7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1997) (holding the antenuptial agreement valid);
Seefeldt v. Seefeldt, 571 N.W.2d 924 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (unpublished dis-
position) (setting aside the prenuptial agreement because of inequality).
1997 divorce cases where the husband challenged the validity of the
agreement include the following. In a Delaware case, the husband challenged
the validity. See Tarburton v. Tarburton, No. CN96-6373, 1997 WL 878411,
at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 8, 1997) (holding the antenuptial agreement valid un-
der Pennsylvania law); Knight v. Knight, No.CK93-3241, 1997 WL 878461
(Del. Fam. Ct. June 9, 1997) (stating the prenuptial agreement argument was
waived). In a Minnesota case, the husband challenged the validity of the
agreement. See Hestad v. Hestad, No. C1-97-386, 1997 WL 668218, at *5
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1997) (holding the antenuptial agreement valid).
Lastly, in Texas, a husband also challenged the validity of the agreement. See
Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 740-41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the
premarital agreement not unconscionable).
106. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g(a)(2) (West 1999); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 37:2-38(b) (West 1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(b) (West
1999) (stating that the modification or elimination of spousal support is exam-
ined at dissolution); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8(b) (Michie 1999) (finding
modification or elimination of spousal maintenance is examined at dissolu-
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premarital agreements were permitted to be examined at divorce to
account for changed circumstances that could not be foreseen at the
time of execution of the agreement. For instance, the birth of chil-
dren with disabilities or the ill health of one spouse could render a
seemingly fair agreement at the time of the wedding grossly unfair at
the time of dissolution. However, in the quest for certainty of en-
forcement, the UPAA opted to examine unconscionability only when
the premarital agreement was executed. If the entire agreement were
subject to judicial review at the time of dissolution the parties' origi-
nal agreement may be undermined and may result in uncertainty that
the UPAA sought to avoid. However, the present California scheme
of prohibiting spousal support waivers would preserve the parties'
intentions regarding their property rights while allowing discretion to
adjust for gross unfairness resulting from unanticipated circum-
stances.
The unconscionability standard, even if applied at the time of
dissolution, is difficult to meet. According to the Indiana Supreme
Court, in the recent case of Rider v. Rider,10 7 "[u]nconscionability
involves a gross disparity.'108 In Rider, Leslie and Charles Rider
married in 1988 and separated in 1992. Their premarital agreement
specified that neither shall acquire property rights by virtue of the
marriage and that neither shall have rights to claim support or ali-
mony. Because Leslie's health had deteriorated during the course of
tion); Girard v. Girard, No. FA950710125, 1998 WL 345541, at *14 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 16, 1998) (finding a prenuptial agreement which eliminates an
award of alimony for an undereducated, unskilled mother of three preschool
children is unconscionable); Siegel v. Siegel, No. F9401411705, 1996 WL
222140, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 1998) (holding prenuptial agreement
unenforceable where husband's assets had increased 40% from date of mar-
riage); Brooks v. Brooks, 1997 WL 297586, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 20,
1997) (holding it is unfair to enforce prenuptial agreement where two young
children and husband's assets are six times what they were at time of mar-
riage); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and The Lim-
its of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 254-58 (1995); Louis Parley, Premari-
tal Agreements in Connecticut: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 69
CONN. B.J. 495 (1995); Robert Roy, Annotation, Enforceability of Premarital
Agreements Governing Support or Property Rights Upon Divorce or Separa-
tion as Affected by Fairness or Adequacy of Those Terms-Modern Status, 53
A.L.R. 4TH 161 (1988).
107. 669 N.E.2d 166 (Ind. 1996).
108. Id. at 164.
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the marriage, rendering her unable to work, the trial court ordered
Charles to pay Leslie $225 a month as maintenance. Yet, the court
did not find the premarital agreement to be unconscionable. The
court stated, "While we sympathize with her, and we understand that
enforcement of this contract eventually may force her to sell her
home, we cannot find enforcement . . . to be unconscionable."
' 10 9
The court reasoned that there was no "gross disparity" because Leslie
had assets worth at least $65,000 while Charles had a modest gross
income stream of $1,247 per month.110 As a result, the trial court's
maintenance award was not permitted. Thus the unconscionability
standard, even if applied at dissolution, will not necessarily result in
overturning a premarital waiver of spousal support. The Rider court
suggested that an unconscionable situation would involve "one
spouse.., left with considerable assets while the other spouse is left
virtually penniless, with no means of support."' 1 The recent adop-
tion of the UPAA in Indiana seems to have codified the Rider court's
version of unconscionability by providing that only "extreme hard-
ship under circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of
execution of the agreement" will allow a court to award spousal sup-
port. 112
Applied to the Pendleton facts, it is clear that spousal support
would not be appropriate even if California enacted an unconscion-
ability at dissolution standard like Indiana's. Like the Rider situa-
tion, the Fireman marriage lasted only four years. However, both
Barry and Candace are wealthy individuals, each owning "substantial
assets and each earned thousands of dollars a month in investment
income."1 13 They lived a lavish lifestyle, funded primarily by Barry,
who earned far more than Candace. "The trial court found his annual




112. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8(b) (Michie 1999).
113. See Respondent-Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 9, Pendle-
ton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. Bl 13293). Barry's
monthly income was approximately $83,000; Candace's approximately
$9,000. See Appellant-Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 3,
Pendleton v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. B 113293).
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available to her."' 1 4 If the unconscionability standard is the gross
disparity between the ex-spouses whereby one has considerable as-
sets and the other is virtually penniless, then it would be correct to
uphold a premarital agreement support waiver in a case like Pendle-
ton.
On the other hand, if the trial court determined spousal support
under present guidelines, then the court must make a determination
based upon the marital standard of living. In the Pendleton-Fire-
man marriage, the standard of living was very high. However, the
trial court must also only assure that the spouse seeking support will
be able to become self-supporting in a reasonable period of time.
Here, Candace would be self-sufficient without any support from
Barry. Therefore, the result should have been the same with or with-
out a premarital agreement support waiver-Candace would not re-
ceive spousal support.
The New Jersey definition of an unconscionable premarital
agreement would also allow consideration of unforeseen circum-
stances. The New Jersey formulation is a combination of UPAA
section 6(b) and the holding of the 1984 case of Marschall v.
Marschall.115 Under the New Jersey version of the UPAA, 116 an
agreement is unconscionable if: (1) a spouse would become a public
charge, or (2) a spouse would be left without reasonable support, or
(3) a spouse would have a standard of living far below that enjoyed
before the marriage. The Marschall case involved an older couple
with grown children from prior marriages. The wife Reba, who
sought pendente lite spousal support upon separation after four years
of marriage, earned an annual income of about $20,000 and received
Social Security benefits of $200 a month.1 17 The husband, John, had
a net worth estimated at $5 million with an annual income over
$250,000.118 Their premarital agreement included a separate
property arrangement but also provided that if the marriage
114. Respondent-Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits at 9, Pendleton
v. Fireman, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. B 113293).
115. 477 A.2d 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984).
116. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-32 (West 1999).
117. Marschall, 477 A.2d at 835.
118. Id.
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terminated during John's lifetime, he would pay Reba $100,000 "in
full satisfaction of all claims against him."'
1 9
The Marschall court was the first New Jersey court to face the
question of the validity of premarital agreements, which in the past
had been considered void as against public policy. The court fol-
lowed the lead of the landmark Florida case, Posner v. Posner,120 and
held that "antenuptial agreement[s] fixing post divorce rights and
obligations" should be held valid and enforceable. 121 However, the
Marschall court also required that a premarital agreement be made
with "full and complete disclosure.' 22 Even with full disclosure, the
court stated that "there must be some level of 'unconscionability'
which would bar enforcement of an antenuptial agreement .... ,123
The court continued, "[a]n agreement which would leave a spouse a
public charge or close to it, or which would provide a standard of
living far below that which was enjoyed both before and during the
marriage would probably not be enforced by any court."'
124
A premarital agreement would not be considered unconscion-
able, according to the Marschall court, "simply by showing a sub-
stantial difference between his or her rights under the agreement, and
what might be awarded by a court in absence of the agreement."'
25
In short, an agreement that may seem "unfair" would not necessarily
be "unconscionable." Although spousal support is generally set
based on the standard of living during the marriage, the court sug-
gested that a premarital agreement that provided the ex-spouse a
119. Id.
120. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); see Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake,
Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND.
L.J. 453 (1998); Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of
Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REv. 887 (1997). Professor Stake pro-
posed that premarital agreements should be mandatory. See Jeffrey Evans
Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992). See
generally Robert Roy, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to Validity of
Premarital Agreements Contemplating Divorce or Separation, 53 A.L.R. 4TH
22 (1988).
121. Marschall, 477 A.2d at 838; see Silbaugh, supra note 59, at 70-76
(giving a brief history of doctrine governing premarital agreements).
122. Marschall, 477 A.2d at 840.
123. Id. at 840.
124. Id. at 840-41.
125. Id. at 841.
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lower standard of living would not bar enforcement of the agree-
ment. If the agreement allowed the ex-spouse "to again live at the
reasonably comfortable standard she had enjoyed prior to marrying
... (albeit somewhat less affluently than she lived during the mar-
riage) it is difficult to see why the agreement should not be enforced
. ,126 The court anticipated that such an agreement might be con-
sidered unconscionable where there is a lengthy marriage or one with
children, 127 but not in the Marschalls' marriage.
In a later New Jersey case, Jacobitti v. Jacobitti,128 the trial
court followed the Marschall standards and found that the spouses'
premarital agreement was unconscionable because "the divorce
would leave [the husband] a wealthy man and [the wife] virtually
penniless.' ' 129 In that case, the marriage lasted sixteen years and the
wife was wheelchair bound and suffering from progressively
deteriorating multiple sclerosis. Although the husband was sixteen
years older than the wife, he was in good health and had assets far
exceeding those of the wife. 130 However, in DeLorean v.
DeLorean,13 1 decided soon after Marschall, the court found that the
couple's separate property agreement was not unconscionable even
though the result could be considered "small, inadequate or dispro-
portionate."' 132 Because the wife had substantial income from her
position as a talk-show host and a life interest in a trust fund
which had assets over $2 million, the agreement was not
126. Id. The court was unwilling to decide the question of enforceability
until the question of full disclosure had been resolved. See id. Thus, the court
denied the husband's motion for summary judgment and granted the wife's
motion for pendente lite support. See id. at 842.
127. See id. at 841.
128. 623 A.2d 794 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
129. Id. at 796. One aspect of the decision was that the husband had not
completely disclosed his net worth when the agreement was executed. See id.
130. The agreement stated that the husband had assets of over $1.3 million
and an annual income of over $100,000, compared to the wife's assets of over
$2000 and an income of $12,500. Id. It is not exactly clear what the agree-
ment's provisions were at divorce, but the court stated that the wife would "re-
ceive nothing if the parties were separated or divorced at the time of plaintiffs
death." Id.
131. 511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
132. Id. at 1259.
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unconscionable. The touchstone was that the wife would not become
"destitute or as a public charge."
133
If the New Jersey standards were applied to the Pendleton facts,
Candace would receive no spousal support. Because of her substan-
tial property which provided her income, she would neither become a
public charge nor be rendered without a means of reasonable sup-
port. Concerning the standard of living under New Jersey law, the
important point is that it refers to that which was enjoyed before the
marriage. Although Candace would certainly not live at the standard
which she enjoyed while living with Barry, her standard of living
would be comparable to that enjoyed before the marriage.
Under the New Jersey standards, in the Bonds case, if there had
been a spousal support waiver in addition to the separate property
provisions, Sun would probably have received a spousal support
award. Sun was caring for two minor children. Before her marriage,
she had been attending beautician school. There would be two bases
for considering the spousal support waiver unconscionable under the
New Jersey statute. First, because she did not have property nor
seemed to be employable, she would not have a "reasonable" means
of support. Second, without a share of community property or
spousal support, she would be relegated to a standard of living far
below that which was enjoyed before the marriage. With the respon-
sibility of the children, even with child support from Barry, she
would have difficulty pursuing any realistic career options. Thus, a
court could find the spousal support waiver under the New Jersey
standard unconscionable even if it upheld the separate property pro-
visions.
Thus the New Jersey unconscionability standard would uphold
spousal support waivers in most cases but would provide additional
protection in those situations where a long marriage or child care had
reduced a spouse's ability to maintain the standard of living enjoyed
before the marriage. If California were to follow states that permit
spousal support waivers, the New Jersey formulation better protects
against those circumstances that can adversely affect a spouse at dis-
solution.
133. Id. at 1260.
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A STANDARD
TO PREVENT ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Although the CPAA provides that an "unconscionable" pre-
marital contract will be unenforceable, 134 the definition of "uncon-
scionable" is "a matter of law" left to the courts. 135 In the context of
premarital agreements, no California court decision has articulated
the criteria for deciding whether a premarital agreement is uncon-
scionable at divorce.' 36 Under California Civil Code section 1670.5,
which is identical to UCC section 2-302, courts may refuse to en-
force an ordinary contract that is "unconscionable at the time it was
made."' 137 The legislative history explains that the purpose of the
legislation was to prevent oppression, unfair surprise, and one-sided
bargains.1
38
Most court decisions on the unconscionability issue have in-
volved arbitration clauses in employment contracts. In the recent
case of Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,139 the California Court of Appeal
found that an arbitration clause was unconscionable and thus unen-
forceable. On the issue of "substantive" unconscionability, 140 the
court used the "traditional standard of unconscionability-contract
terms so one-sided as to 'shock the conscience.' 141 That particular
arbitration clause was so one-sided because it provided "the em-
ployer [with] more rights and greater remedies than would otherwise
134. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a)(2) (West 1998).
135. Id.
136. In a pre-CPAA case involving a probate proceeding, a premarital
agreement in which the wife waived all her marital rights including spousal
support was considered invalid. See Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138,
142-43, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354-55 (1964) (suggesting that a "shock the con-
science" standard should be applied to determine unconscionability).
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1998).
138. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 cmt. 1 (West 1998) (Legislative Com-
mittee Comment-Assembly).
139. 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1997).
140. "Procedural" as well as "substantive" unconscionability are considered
by California courts. The procedural standard has to do with inequality of bar-
gaining power and lack of disclosure. See id. at 1532, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
These "procedural requirements" are also embodied in CPAA at CAL. FAM.
CODE § 1615 (West 1998), involving enforceability of premarital agreements.
This discussion focuses only on the "substantive" standards.
141. Stirlen, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1532, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
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be available and concomitantly deprive[d] employees of significant
rights and remedies they would normally enjoy." 142 Similarly, in the
more recent case of Kinney v. United Healthcare Services,143 the
California Court of Appeal again found an arbitration clause to be
unconscionable because only the employee was required to submit
her claims to arbitration: "the unilateral obligation to arbitrate is it-
self so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable."'
144
In the only case to consider the definition of unconscionability
under the UPAA, the Texas Court of Appeals in Marsh v. Marsh also
turned to commercial law.145  On the issue of substantive uncon-
scionability, the court used the standard of "whether the contract is
oppressive or unreasonable., 146 There was a conflict between the
testimony of the experts on that issue. The husband's expert testified
that the agreement was unconscionable per se because the wife was
the only one who had power over the trust created by the agreement
and could exercise that power at any time. The wife's expert dis-
agreed stating that fairness did not determine unconscionability but
only an agreement "so far one-sided that no reasonable person could
consider it to be an arm's length transaction."' 147 The agreement in
Marsh provided that the husband, Bill, would transfer one-half of his
assets to a trust of which provided his wife, Juanita, was trustee and
sole beneficiary. Bill and Juanita were income beneficiaries during
their lives, but Juanita was set to receive the corpus of the trust upon
Bill's death. The court rejected Bill's assertion that the one-sided
nature of the agreement, although unfair, necessitated a finding of
unconscionability. 148 Rejecting all of Bill's arguments, the court
142. Id. at 1542, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
143. 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1999).
144. Id. at 1332, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354.
145. See Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). "In the ab-
sence of clear guidance as to the definition of 'unconscionability' in marital
property cases, courts have turned to the commercial context." Id. at 739-40.
See also S. Christine Mercing, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act: Survey of Its Impact in Texas and Across the Nation, 42 BAYLOR L. REV.
825, 830-31 (1990) ("One would assume that the Texas courts will follow
commercial or contract law interpretations of unconscionability.").
146. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d at 740 (citing Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1975)).
147. Id. at 742.
148. See id. at 741-42.
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held that the agreement was not unconscionable as a matter of law. 1
49
The Marsh court's analysis confirms that unconscionability means
more than unfairness but must be either grossly unfair or one-sided.
It is difficult to transfer the definition found in employment
cases or those cases involving only property arrangements to the
waiver of all rights at divorce via a premarital agreement. On the
one hand, giving up all rights to community property and to spousal
support upon divorce differs from giving up procedural rights once
employment terminates. On the other hand, if one spouse will re-
ceive all the benefits of the marital union and the other spouse none,
such a premarital agreement in some cases may be so one-sided that
it shocks the conscience. The UPAA attempts to ameliorate the one-
sided nature of such bargains, even if entered into voluntarily and
with sufficient disclosure, by allowing courts discretion if one ex-
spouse will be relegated to welfare.
The major question facing California courts and the legislature
is how to prevent completely one-sided bargains even if they were
voluntary bargains and if they were made after sufficient disclosure.
At present, the legislative scheme prohibits spousal support waivers
and thus prevents egregiously unfair bargains by leaving the courts
with discretion to award spousal support. If spousal support waivers
would be allowed and the present provisions regarding unconscion-
ability are unchanged, egregiously one-sided premarital agreements
cannot be challenged so long as they were voluntarily entered into
and there was sufficient disclosure. That in itself "shocks the con-
science." If the CPAA was amended to allow challenges based on
unconscionability at divorce, courts would face increased litigation
over the fairness of individual bargains. This would add another
layer of issues to be decided in addition to whether and how long
spousal support should be awarded. The purpose of the UIPAA and
CPAA was to provide certainty and enforceability of premarital
agreements. The present system does just that. It is highly unusual
for waivers of community property rights to be challenged because
there is another remedy for a spouse disadvantaged by the marriage.
149. See id. at 743. The court also rejected Bill's other arguments regarding
the circumstances and timing of the signing of the agreement, bargaining
power of the parties, and the absence of independent counsel. See id. at 740-
42.
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The best solution seems to be to retain the present system rather than
try to provide guidelines regarding unconscionability either through
new legislative action or by court decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The Pendleton case demands re-examination of whether spousal
support waivers should be allowed in premarital agreements. The
present system of prohibiting those waivers allows courts to amelio-
rate economic disparities that occur at divorce through spousal sup-
port awards, yet retains the property arrangements agreed to prior to
marriage. If spousal support waivers are permitted, under the present
legislative scheme it would be extremely difficult to challenge
agreements that result in vast differences in economic outcomes for
the spouses at divorce. Although the CPAA could be amended to
give courts discretion either to prevent an ex-spouse from falling to
the level of welfare assistance or to allow for reasonable spousal
support, this would lead to increased litigation on those particular is-
sues. The optimum solution is to continue to treat spousal support
differently from property arrangements and leave the spousal support
issue in the hands of the courts.
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